INTRODUCTION
Air traffic control specialists (ATCSs) are called upon to sort-out and project the paths of an everincreasing number of aircraft in order to ensure goals of minimum separation and safe, efficient take-off, en route and landing operations. This job relies upon the situation awareness (SA) of controllers who must maintain current assessments of the rapidly changing location of each aircraft (in three-dimensional space) and their projected future locations relative to each other, along with other pertinent aircraft parameters (destination, fuel, speed, etc...)-Controllers have historically called this "the picture" -their mental model of the situation upon which all of their decisions rely. "The central skill of the controller seems to be the ability to respond to a variety of quantitative inputs about several aircraft simultaneously and to form a continuously changing mental picture to be used as the basis for planning and controlling the course of the aircraft" (Dailey, 1984) . Providing controllers with an accurate, complete, and up-to-date picture of the situation may prove to be a daunting challenge as the environment in which they work becomes even more complex and demanding.
While several definitions of SA have been offered, the most generally applicable definition is that provided by Endsley (1987; 1988) . "Situation awareness is the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future." A crucial factor in understanding SA in the ATC environment rests on a clear elucidation of the elements in this definition. The objective of this effort was to determine those elements for En Route ATC. Figure 1 presents a description of SA in relation to decision making and performance. The controller's perception of the elements in the environment, as determined from various displays, readouts, and communications channels forms the basis for situation awareness. The quality of a controller's SA is moderated by his/her capabilities, training and experience, preconceptions and objectives, and ongoing taskworkload.
Situation awareness forms the critical input to, but is separate from, decision making, which is the basis for all subsequent actions. Proper implementation of rules and procedures will depend on the quality of the controller's SA. Even the best trained and most experienced controllers can make the wrong decisions if they have incomplete or inaccurate SA. Conversely, an inexperienced controller may accurately understand what is occurring in the environment, yet not know the correct action to take. For this reason, it is important that SA be considered separately from the decision making and performance stages. To further expand on the above definition, SA can be described in three hierarchical phases, as depicted in Figure 1 .
Level 1 SA -Perception of the elements in the environment
The first phase in achieving SA involves perceiving the status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment. The ATCS needs to accurately perceive each of the aircraft in his/her airspace and their relevant attributes (ID, airspeed, position, route, direction of flight, altitude, etc.), weather, pilot and controller requests, emergency information, and other pertinent elements.
Level 2 SA -Comprehension of the current situation
Comprehension of the situation is based on a synthesis of disjointed Level 1 elements. Level 2 SA goes beyond simply being aware of the elements that are present to include an understanding of the significance of those elements in light of the controller's Based upon knowledge of Level 1 elements, particularly when put together to form patterns with the other elements, a holistic picture of the environment will be formed, including a comprehension of the significance of objects and events. The controller needs to put together disparate bits of data to determine the impact of a change in one aircraft's flight status on another, or deviations in aircraft positions ffom expected or allowable values. A novice controller might be capable of achieving the same Level 1 SA as a more experienced one, but may fall short in the ability to integrate various data elements, along with pertinent goals to comprehend the situation, as well.
Level 3 SA -Projection of future status
First it is the ability to project the future actions of the elements in the environment, at least in the near term, that forms the third and highest level of situation awareness. This is achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the elements and a comprehension of the situation (both Level 1 and Level 2 SA). For example, the controller must not only comprehend that three aircraft, given their directions of flight and altitudes, are likely to violate separation rules within a certain period of time, but also determine what airspace will be available to make routing decisions, and ascertain where other potential conflicts may develop. This ability gives the controller the knowledge (and time) necessary to decide on the most favorable course of action. While SA can be described as the controller's knowledge of the environment at a given point in time, it should be recognized that SA is highly temporal in nature. It is not acquired instantaneously, but is built up over time. Ascertaining aircraft dynamics based on past actions and conditions is part of what allows the controller to project the state of the environment in the near future. It is for this reason that adherence to procedures associated with the position relief briefing is critical. Position relief briefings, involving the use of a checklist, are used to ensure the completeness of information shared. During the briefing, the relief controller typically acquires adequate SA to perform his/her job. Second, SA is highly spatial in nature in this environment. In addition to a consideration of the spatial relationships between aircraft, the ground, weather patterns, winds, etc., there is also a spatially-determined and goal-determined specification of just which subsets of the environment are currently important to SA, based on the tasks at hand. ATCSs typically have well-defined spatial boundaries within which their responsibility lies. Within these boundaries, the region may be further subdivided, based on importance to SA. For example, the boundary may shift spatially and temporally to include different aircraft, depending on current goals and tasks, or may shift functionally to include different aspects of aircraft that are being controlled. This subdivision can be dynamically modified as various tasks present themselves by refocusing on different elements within the problem space or by changing the boundaries of the problem space itself.
Within the list of elements that controllers find necessary for good SA, not all elements have equal importance at all times. When conditions are clear, for instance, weather may not be a primary consideration. Controllers may opt to shift attention away from some aircraft to concentrate on a few that are potentially conflicting. It is important to note, however, that elements never become irrelevant or unimportant, just secondary at certain points in time. At least some SA on all elements is required at all times, to know which can be made secondary and which should be primary. And at least some SA is required even on secondary elements in order to know that they have not become primary. Many times it is those elements, deemed as secondary, that cause serious errors when SA on those elements is totally lost. Danaher (1980) reported on a near mid-air collision between a DC-10 and an L-1011, in which the controller was aware of the potential of a traffic conflict between the two jets, yet "became preoccupied with secondary tasks" and failed to monitor the progress of the situation or to report it to the relief controller. Twenty-four people were injured in the resultant evasive maneuver by one of the pilots who managed to avoid a collision at the last minute. Situation awareness is highly important for successful performance in the demanding ATC environment. Mogford and Tansley (1991) found that 65 percent of the involved facilities could be classified as having low SA -where the controller was less likely to be aware that a problem was developing. In addition, increased awareness that an error situation was developing was found to be related to a decreased severity of the error.
Rodgers and Nye reported that a high percentage of operational errors can be directly attributed to SA problems. Some 36 percent of the operational errors investigated involved communications errors, with 20 percent specifically involving readback problems. Furthermore, communications problems and readback errors, specifically those involving altitude information, were significantly more likely to be involved in operational errors of a greater severity. This finding agrees with an earlier study by Monan (1986) , who found that 78.6 percent of communications errors involved aircrew mishearing ATC clearance/instructions; and 71.5 percent involved an acknowledged failure on the part of the controller to hear the aircrew's error during readback. It should be noted that, considering the total number of communications made, readback problems occur very infrequently.
Rodgers and Nye also found that 57 percent of operational errors investigated could be directly attributed to problems involving the radar display, with 14 percent involving misidentification of information (SA level 1) and 47 percent involving "inappropriate use of displayed data" (SA levels 2 and 3). (Some errors were placed in both categories.) The latter category was more likely to be associated with less severe errors, however, with the exception of conflict alert information, which was directly associated with a higher severity of errors.
Objective & Scope
The objective of this effort was to determine the situation awareness information requirements of the En Route Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS), including perception (level 1), comprehension (level 2), and projection (level 3) of elements per the prior definition of SA. These requirements can be used as input to system/equipment design, training, and research and evaluation efforts which need to consider the situation awareness needs of the controller.
Approach
The requirements analysis was performed as a goaldirected task analysis, based on the methodology of Endsley (1993) . The SA information requirements were defined as those dynamic information needs associated with the major goals or sub-goals of the controller in performing his or her job. To accomplish this, the major goals of the job were identified, along with the major subgoals necessary for meeting each of these goals. The major decisions associated with each subgoal, that needed to be made, were identified. The SA information requirements for making these decisions and carrying out each sub-goal were then identified. These requirements focused not only on what data the controller needed, but also on how that information was integrated or combined to address each decision. Several caveats need to be mentioned in relation to this analysis.
(1) At any given time, more than one goal or subgoal may be operating, although these will not always have the same priority. The analysis does ' not assume any prioritization among goals, or that each subgoal within a goal will always be relevant. (2) The analysis is based on goals or objectives, and was as technology-free as possible. How the information is acquired was not addressed. In some cases, it may be through the radar display, flight progress strips, controller communications with pilots or other controllers, or the controller may have to determine it on his/her own. Many of the higher-level SA information requirements fall into this category. (3) The analysis sought to determine what controllers would ideally like to know to meet each goal. It is recognized that they often must operate on the basis of incomplete information and that some desired information may not be available with today's system.
(4) Static knowledge, such as procedures or rules for performing tasks, is outside the bounds of this analysis. The analysis focused only on primarily dynamic situational information that affects what the controllers do.
Methodology
Analysis to determine the SA information requirements for En Route ATCS was comprised of several inter-related activities: (1) analysis and review of the restructured CTA Job Task Taxonomy (Rodgers and Drechsler, 1993) (2) expert elicitation with experienced ATCs, and (3) review and evaluation of videotapes of simulated ATC scenarios.
Task Taxonomy Evaluation
First, the restructured CTA Job Task Taxonomy (Rodgers and Drechsler, 1993 ) was reviewed to determine major tasks and goals of the ATCS. Information sources and information requirements referred to in the document were determined and listed as possible indications of SA information requirements. The task hierarchy was converted into a diagrammatic form, to achieve a visual representation of an entire task area. The task diagrams and information requirements identified for each task were used to support the second two lines of inquiry (expert elicitation and scenario evaluation).
Expert Elicitation
Eight ATCSs, currently assigned as instructors at the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City, served as subject matter experts, who possessed a broad experience base in En Route ATC, including experience in high, low, ultra-high, arrival and departure sectors, as shown in Table 1 . The subjects had an average of 6.2 years of experience as Full Performance Level (FPL) controllers and had, on average, been out of the field for 11.0 months.
Each subject was interviewed individually. In the first session, subjects were provided an introduction to the overall research effort in ATC incident analysis and to the objectives of this project in particular. One or two actual ATC incidents were re-created for them using the Situation Assessment Through the Re-creation of Incidents (SATORI) system (Rodgers and Duke, 1993) to serve as a memory prompt for the ensuing session.
Each subject was interviewed for one-and-a-half hours. During this time, a detailed discussion of one or more major ATC tasks (e.g., separate aircraft, analyze weather) was conducted. The task diagrams and information identified from the Task Taxonomy were used to query the subjects as to: goals, decisions, and processing requirements associated with each task, and thereby, the SA needed for successful completion of each task. Particular attention was paid to SUBJECT YEARS AT FPL Based on the information obtained from the task taxonomy and the subjects, a goal -di rected task breaking expert elicitation. As over-generalizing and summarizing are well known shortcomings of the expert elicitation verbalization processes, the evaluation of these scenarios was important for helping to ensure completeness in the task breakdowns developed.
down was created for each major ATCS goal. This lists the major goals, relevant subgoals, questions to be determined in meeting each subgoal, and first, second-and third-level SA elements required for addressing these questions. Each of the subjects returned for a second one-anda-half hour session. At this time, the goal directed task breakdown from the subject's previous session was reviewed with the subject. Necessary corrections and additions to the breakdown were determined by the subject. Additional questions regarding SA information requirements for these tasks were addressed, based on the comments of other subjects and the task taxonomy document. During the second session, initial expert elicitation for the major task area addressed by each of these subjects was completed.
Videotape Analysis
The third line of effort focused on a review of videotaped scenarios of ATCSs performing simulated ATC activities, accompanied by a detailed interview regarding the cognitive processes employed during these tasks. The videotaped simulations and interviews were orginally used for the development of the Human Technology, Inc. cognitive task analysis (HTI, 1990) , Seven scenarios (each approximately 30 minutes in length) were reviewed.
This process served to help develop an organizing structure for the task breakdowns by providing insight into the controller's tasks, and as a means of expanding the goal-directed task analysis. The scenarios were evaluated and compared to the task breakdowns developed during expert elicitation. The cognitive processes reported to be employed during the scenarios and the information reported being considered in those processes were determined.
These factors were compared to the task breakdowns to (1) confirm the results of the expert elicitation, and (2) determine tasks, goals, processes, or information requirements that were not derived dur-
Final Review
A draft version of the goal-directed task breakdowns for all of the ATCS major goals and tasks was then developed. Next, the draft analysis was circulated to each of the eight subject matter experts for review. They were asked to examine the analysis for completeness and accuracy and make any changes needed. This process allowed each of the subjects to review the document at their leisure, taking into account the SA information requirements of the entire job, and resolving any inconsistencies or language problems. These reviews were then incorporated to form the final SA analysis.
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
From the above procedures, a goal hierarchy, presented in Appendix A, was constructed, which contains the controllers' major goals and subgoals. A listing of the major decision tasks and situation awareness information requirements at all three levels for each subgoal were determined, and are contained in the goal-directed task analysis presented in Appendix B. Considerable overlap is present in situation awareness information requirements between subgoals, as well as a large degree of inter-relatedness between subgoals, as would be expected.
The listing includes many factors that the subjects felt were important to decision making in achieving each of these goals. A careful review of these factors reveals that some are fairly dynamic SA information requirements (e.g., aircraft location, rate of change of altitude), while others are more static (e.g., number of airports, type of special airspace). In addition, some factors did not pertain to the external environment (e.g., one's own fatigue, capabilities).
This list was carefully reviewed to determine those elements that conform to the definition of SA, focusing on dynamic factors within the environment. From this process, a listing of situation awareness information requirements across subgoals was compiled, and is presented in Table 2 . This list includes the controllers' major SA information requirements (for dynamic information), exclusive of static knowledge requirements, sources of the information, or associated tasks. These requirements have been broken down into each of the three levels, perception of elements (level 1), comprehension of their meaning (level 2) and projection of the future (level 3).
This analysis should be useful for guiding the design and development of future ATC systems. An explicit consideration of controller SA information requirements, particularly at the higher levels, should be beneficial for designing more efficient interfaces and suitable automated assistance to ease controller workload and enhance SA in the performance of their tasks. In addition, this list of SA information requirements can be used to direct SA measurement efforts as they pertain to ATC system design evaluation, training technique evaluation, error investigation, or construct exploration.
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The goal directed task analysis lists each of the controller's main goals, associated subgoals and situation awareness information requirements for meeting these subgoals. The format of the document is as follows:
X.X Goal (Associated task taxonomy ID (Rodgers and Drechsler, 1993) ) XXX Subgoal • questions to be answered to meet the goal • SA information requirements (high level)
• SA information requirements (low level)
There are few guidelines that should be kept in mind when reviewing this document.
• At any given time more than one goal or subgoal may be operating, although these will not always have the same priority. The attached listing does not assume any prioritization among them, or that each subgoal within a goal will always come up.
• These are goals or objectives, not tasks. The analysis is supposed to be as technology free as possible. How the information is acquired is not addressed. In some cases it may be through the radar display, the flight progress strips, communications, other controllers, or the controller may have to determine it on his or her own or guess. Many of the higher level SA information requirements may fall into this category. This analysis does not address how a controller would get the information or problems with information overload.
• The analysis sought to define what controllers would ideally like to know to meet each goal. It is recognized that they often must operate on the basis of incomplete information and that some desired information may not be available at all with today's system.
• Static knowledge, such as procedures or rules for performing tasks, is also outside the bounds of this analysis. The analysis primarily identifies dynamic situational information that affects what controllers do. • lateral distance between aircraft along route (projected)
Avoid Conflictions
• lateral distance between aircraft (current) I I n
• aircraft position • projected aircraft route (current) (2.1.1) • aircraft capabilities (2.1.2) • Separation with uncontrolled objects meets or exceeds limits?
• lateral distance between aircraft and object (current)
• vertical distance between aircraft and object (current) • hand-off acceptance • point-out acceptance
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Appendix B
Avoid airspace • time and distance till turn aircraft?
• amount of turn or new heading required?
• amount of altitude change required?
• projected position of aircraft relative to airspace
• current position of aircraft relative to airspace I M "
• projected aircraft route (current) (2. 
